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Use of Domestic Violence History Evidence
in the Criminal Prosecution: A Common
Sense Approach
Lisa A. Linsky*
I. Introduction
There is probably not a person in the Land who does not
have some knowledge or familiarity with the so-called "trial of
the century," the O.J. Simpson murder case. The celebrity of
the defendant, the other major players, and the case itself had,
and continues to have, society as a whole discussing domestic
violence and the effectiveness of our laws that deal with this
area of criminal law.
Since the commission of the crimes in June of 1994, the
Simpson' case brought to the forefront the issue of what role
evidence of prior domestic violence should play in criminal pros-
ecutions. In addition to the forensic evidence which the Los An-
geles prosecutors relied upon to attempt to convict Mr.
Simpson, the theory of the prosecution's case rested on the
proposition that Mr. Simpson committed the murders against
his former wife, Nicole Brown Simpson (hereinafter Ms.
Brown), and her friend, Ronald Goldman, because of jealousy,
obsession, and the need to dominate Ms. Brown. The prosecu-
tion's case rested entirely upon circumstantial evidence, and as
such, the prosecutors sought to introduce evidence of Mr. Simp-
son's past abusive conduct toward Ms. Brown to establish the
* Assistant District Attorney and Chief of the Child Abuse and Sex Crimes
Bureau of the Westchester County District Attorney's Office. B.A. 1981 Villanova
University; J.D. 1984 Pace University School of Law. I wish to thank Denise Ac-
curso, Diane Selker, Robin Lamont, Jody Albert and Lauren Joey Faust for their
assistance and support in the preparation of this Article. I am especially grateful
to my colleagues in the Battered Women's Movement who have fought, and con-
tinue to fight, for the dignity and legal rights of battered women and children.
Finally, this Article is dedicated to my grandfather, David M. Goldberg, whose un-
conditional devotion to me and respect for the law, have made me believe that any
challenge can be championed.
1. No. BA097211 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 1995).
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identity of the perpetrator and his motives to commit the brutal
crimes. The prosecution argued that the history of domestic vi-
olence and prior threats were probative evidence of Mr. Simp-
son's motive, intent, plan, and identity as the killer. According
to Los Angeles District Attorney Gil Garcetti, the trial judge's
ruling on the admissibility of this evidence was the "most criti-
cal ruling" that the Court would make in the case.2
The prior conduct which the prosecution wanted to intro-
duce on its direct case included acts of physical beatings upon
Ms. Brown by Mr. Simpson, some of which were documented by
photographs showing Ms. Brown's injuries. 3 Other incidents in-
cluded an episode in which Mr. Simpson had thrown Ms. Brown
out of a moving car; a 1989 assault for which Ms. Brown had
been hospitalized due to her injuries; Mr. Simpson's 1989 no
contest plea to spousal abuse for which he was ordered to un-
dergo counseling and pay a fine; letters of apology for the abuse
written by Mr. Simpson to Ms. Brown; Mr. Simpson's repeated
threats to kill Ms. Brown; a 1993 recording of a "911" telephone
call made by Ms. Brown to the police, during which the voice of
Mr. Simpson was heard making threats and shouting obscen-
ities at Ms. Brown; evidence that Mr. Simpson was stalking Ms.
Brown, and that shortly before her death, Ms. Brown had made
contact with a battered women's shelter help-line; and many
other instances of actual and threatened violence committed by
Mr. Simpson against Ms. Brown dating back to 1977. 4
In January 1995, Judge Lance Ito, who presided over the
murder trial, ruled that much of the domestic violence history
would be admissible on the prosecution's direct case, including
the 1993 "911" tape-recorded telephone call by Ms. Brown. The
evidence was admitted to provide the jury with an appreciation
of the "nature and quality" of the relationship between Mr.
Simpson anji Ms. Brown, and to aid in establishing motive, in-
tent, plan, and identity of the killer.5 The judge's ruling was
2. Ito Allows Domestic Violence Evidence, THE REPORTER DISPATCH (White
Plains, N.Y.), Jan. 19, 1995, at lB.
3. Linda Deutsch, Officer Describes Beaten, Hysterical Nicole Simpson, PORT-
LAND OREGONIAN, Feb. 1, 1995, at A01.
4. Susan B. Jordan, Curve Ball for the Defense: How Will They Answer the
Spousal Abuse Evidence in Trial, 1995 WL 20934 (O.J. Comm. at 2, Jan. 23, 1995).
5. David Margolick, Prosecutors Win Key Simpson Fight: Judge Allows Most
Material About Domestic Violence, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1995, at B8.
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considered a significant "victory" for the prosecution: a major
battle won in its war against O.J. Simpson.6
This reaction to the judge's ruling however, raised some
questions regarding the admissibility of so-called "bad act" evi-
dence such as: Is evidence of prior abuse and threats always
relevant and material in a domestic violence prosecution? In
order for the trier of fact to fully understand the relationship
between the accused and the victim, does common sense not dic-
tate that they be presented with as much information as possi-
ble as to ensure a truly informed verdict? If evidence of prior
domestic violence is critical in this type of criminal case, why
does its admissibility depend entirely upon legal argument and
judicial discretion rather than legislative mandate?
The purpose of this Article is to explore the current law in
New York State regarding the use of prior charged and un-
charged crimes, bad acts, and threats in the prosecution of do-
mestic violence cases. This Article also discusses the
importance of creating a "paper trail" to document a history of
abuse so that valuable evidence will be preserved should a vic-
tim of domestic violence decide to avail herself or himself7 of the
services of the court systems, or in the unfortunate event of a
domestic homicide where the victim is unable to relate the his-
tory of violence.
II. Admissibility of Domestic Violence History Evidence":
The Law in New York
Judicial hesitancy to admit evidence of prior charged and
uncharged crimes is rooted in the notion that such evidence, by
its nature, is potentially prejudicial to the criminal defendant.
Judges are hesitant to admit this type of evidence out of concern
that the jury will convict the accused because he is an individ-
ual who possesses a bad character or criminal propensity,
6. Jordan, supra note 4, at 1.
7. Hereinafter, this Article will refer to the victim as a female and the offender
as a male. These references are based on the fact that in approximately 95% of the
domestic violence cases handled in Westchester County, the victims are female
and the offenders are male. Statistics on file with Westchester County District
Attorney's Office.
8. "Domestic violence history evidence" is a term that refers to charged and
uncharged crimes, bad acts, threats and other statements by a defendant toward a
victim in a domestic violence prosecution.
1995]
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rather than on the legal standard of proof "beyond a reasonable
doubt."9 As a general rule, evidence of prior charged and un-
charged crimes and bad acts is inadmissible, despite its proba-
tive value, if the purpose for which it is offered is to discredit the
defendant.'0
A general rule of evidence, however, is that "all relevant
evidence is admissible unless its admission violates some exclu-
sionary rule."" Evidence of prior charged and uncharged
crimes is admissible if it tends to establish an element of the
crime charged, or is relevant to one of the well-recognized ex-
ceptions. The Court of Appeals, in People v. Molineux,' recog-
nized some of the issues for which evidence of prior charged and
uncharged crimes and bad acts of a defendant may be rele-
vant.13 Such evidence is commonly referred to. as "Molineux Ev-
idence." The recognized theories under which "Molineux
Evidence" may be introduced include: intent, motive, knowl-
edge, common scheme or plan, and identity of the defendant.
14
This list is merely illustrative, however, and is not exhaustive of
other purposes for which "Molineux Evidence" may be properly
introduced.' 5 While "Molineux Evidence" usually involves the
admission of crimes and bad acts that occurred prior to the
crime for which the defendant stands charged, the Molineux
principles are equally applicable to crimes and bad acts commit-
ted subsequent to the pending charges.16
9. JEROME PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE, § 170, at 139 (10th ed. 1973).
10. See People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40, 535 N.E.2d 250, 538 N.Y.S.2d 197
(1988); People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233, 519 N.E.2d 808, 525 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1987);
People v. Lewis, 69 N.Y.2d 321,506 N.E.2d 915, 514 N.Y.S.2d 205 (1987); People v.
Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350, 420 N.E.2d 59, 438 N.Y.S.2d 261 (1981); People v.
Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901).
11. Lewis, 69 N.Y.2d at 325, 506 N.E.2d at 916, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 207 (citing
Ando v. Woodberry, 8 N.Y.2d 165, 167); PRINCE, supra note 9, § 5, at 5.
12. 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901).
13. Id. at 293, 61 N.E. at 294.
14. Id.
15. People v. Jackson, 39 N.Y.2d 64, 68, 346 N.E.2d 537, 539, 382 N.Y.S.2d
736, 738 (1976); People v. Santarelli, 49 N.Y.2d 241, 248, 401 N.E.2d 119, 204, 425
N.Y.S.2d 77, 82 (1980).
16. See People v. Ingram, 71 N.Y.2d 474, 522 N.E.2d 439, 527 N.Y.S.2d 363
(1988); People v. Calvano, 30 N.Y.2d 199, 282 N.E.2d 322, 331 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1972);
People v. Dupree, 110 A.D.2d 777, 487 N.Y.S.2d 847 (2d Dep't 1985); People v.
Powell, 107 A.D.2d 718, 484 N.Y.S.2d 75 (2d Dep't 1985).
[Vol. 16:73
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol16/iss1/6
COMMON SENSE APPROACH
The trial court must engage in a two-part inquiry to deter-
mine which of the defendant's crimes and/or bad acts will be
admissible upon application by the prosecution. 17 The first part
of the inquiry involves a question of law; that is, whether or not
the prosecution has established, as a threshold matter, some is-
sue relevant to the case other than the mere criminal propen-
sity of the accused.' 8 Once the prosecution meets this threshold
showing, the trial court must then evaluate the probative value
of the proffered evidence against its prejudicial effect.' 9 This
balancing process is entirely within the discretion of the trial
judge.20 It is the prosecutor who bears the responsibility of edu-
cating the trial judge as to the law that favors the admissibility
of evidence of prior charged and uncharged crimes and bad acts
in the domestic violence prosecution. Since domestic violence
cases turn, in large part, on the credibility of the victim, the
prosecution's success in introducing such evidence before the
trier of fact often results in the difference between conviction
and acquittal. The purpose for which this evidence is offered is
the critical focus of the court's inquiry. Thus, if the prosecution
can meet its burden by establishing a theory or purpose other
than showing the defendant's criminal propensity, the appellate
courts tend to approve the trial court's admission of such
evidence. 21
A. Motive and Identity
In domestic violence cases, particularly where the prosecu-
tion's case is circumstantial in nature, evidence of the defend-
ant's motive to commit the charged crimes is significant. To
prove motive and/or identity when these are in issue in the
case,22 the trier of fact must know the nature of the relationship
17. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d at 55, 535 N.E.2d at 258, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 206 (citations
omitted).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40, 535 N.E.2d 250, 538 N.Y.S.2d 197
(1988).
22. In New York, "Molineux Evidence" may be admissible on the issue of iden-
tity, provided that the defendant's identity with respect to the charged crimes has
not been conclusively established and is actually in issue. See People v. Allweiss,
61 A.D.2d 74,401 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1st Dep't 1978), aff'd 48 N.Y.2d 40,47,396 N.E.2d
1995]
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between the defendant and the victim. Although motive, unlike
identity, is not an element of any criminal offense, there is an
inextricable connection between the reason a defendant would
commit the crimes charged and his past conduct toward the vic-
tim. This is especially true when there has been a prior inti-
mate relationship between the defendant and the victim. In
domestic homicides, for example, the perpetrator's motive to kill
his spouse or intimate partner is often rooted in his anger over
the dissolution of his relationship with his spouse or partner,
jealousy, and his loss of control over his spouse's or partner's
actions. When the prosecution's proof is circumstantial, evi-
dence of motive assumes even greater importance in establish-
ing the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the crime
charged. 23
In addition to a defendant's prior abusive conduct toward
his spouse or intimate partner, his threats to commit future
acts of violence are probative evidence of motive, which may be
utilized in the domestic violence case. A threat to commit an
act, in the wake of its attempt or accomplishment, serves as evi-
dence that the act threatened was attempted or accomplished. 24
In a 1987 Westchester County homicide case,25 a young
mother was killed by a gunman whose identity was initially un-
known.26 The defendant, Michael Linton, was the estranged
husband of the victim and was ultimately charged with, and
convicted of murder in the second degree. 27 The case was en-
tirely circumstantial in nature. The prosecution established the
defendant's motive and identity by introducing evidence of the
defendant's prior charged and uncharged crimes and bad acts,
735, 738, 421 N.Y.S.2d 341, 345 (1979); People v. Hill, 163 A.D.2d 813, 558
N.Y.S.2d 345 (4th Dep't 1990).
23. People v. Mixon, 203 A.D.2d 909, 611 N.Y.S.2d 723 (4th Dep't 1994), ap-
peal denied, 84 N.Y.2d 830, 641 N.E.2d 171, 617 N.Y.S.2d 150 (1994); People v.
Harris, 122 A.D.2d 493, 505 N.Y.S.2d 254 (3d Dep't 1986); People v. Dyes, 122
A.D.2d 69, 504 N.Y.S.2d 223 (2d Dep't 1986); PRINCE, supra note 9, § 171, at 141.
24. See People v. Liberatore, 167 A.D.2d 425, 561 N.Y.S.2d 832 (2d Dep't
1990), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 956, 578 N.E.2d 449, 573 N.Y.S.2d 651 (1991);
People v. Linton, 166 A.D.2d 670, 561 N.Y.S.2d 259 (2d Dep't 1990), appeal denied,
77 N.Y.2d 879, 571 N.E.2d 92, 568 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1991); People v. McCaskill, 144
A.D.2d 496, 533 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (2d Dep't 1988).
25. People v. Linton, 166 A.D.2d 670, 561 N.Y.S.2d 259 (2d Dep't 1990).
26. Id. at 670-71, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
27. Id.
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which included: (1) evidence that the victim had expressed an
increasing fear of being killed by the defendant; (2) the defend-
ant's prior threats with a gun; (3) an order of protection that
had been issued against the defendant on behalf of the victim;
and (4) evidence that the victim had sought refuge at a battered
women's shelter prior to her death.28 The Appellate Division af-
firmed the murder conviction and specifically approved of the
use of"Molineux Evidence" on the prosecution's case-in-chief, as
it was "highly probative of the defendant's motive"29 and "di-
rectly related to or 'inextricably interwoven' with the issue of
his identity as the killer."30
The use of domestic violence history evidence to establish
motive or identity is not limited to homicide cases. In People v.
Shorey,31 the Second Department affirmed the defendant's con-
viction of assault in the first degree upon his estranged wife.
The trial court allowed evidence of the defendant's prior bad
acts and threats, which demonstrated that the defendant's mar-
riage was unstable. The appellate court noted that in addition
to being admissible on the issues of motive and identity, the evi-
dence was also admissible as background information to provide
the jury with a better understanding of the nature of the de-
fendant's relationship with the victim, and to put the facts into
an understandable context.32 Likewise, in domestic arson
cases, evidence of a defendant's threats and prior conduct has
been admissible to establish motive and identity of the arson-
ist.33 In cases of sexual assault34 and reckless endangerment, 35
28. Id. at 671, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
29. Id. (citing People v. Ely, 68 N.Y.2d 520, 529, 503 N.E.2d 88, 94, 510
N.Y.S.2d 532, 538 (1986), appeal after remand, 164 A.D.2d 442, 563 N.Y.S.2d 890
(3d Dep't 1990), appeal denied, 77 N.Y.2d 905, 572 N.E.2d 620, 569 N.Y.S.2d 937
(1991)). See also People v. Dyes, 122 A-D.2d 69, 504 N.Y.S.2d 223 (2d Dep't
1986)(affirming the defendant's murder conviction based in part on the prosecu-
tion's use of testimony from the children of the victim who related that the defend-
ant had threatened and menaced their mother months before her death).
30. Id.
31. 172 A.D.2d 634, 568 N.Y.S.2d 436 (2d Dep't 1991), appeal denied, 78
N.Y.2d 974, 580 N.E.2d 426, 574 N.Y.S.2d 954 (1991).
32. Id.
33. People v. Martinez, 169 A.D.2d 561, 564 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1st Dep't 1991),
appeal denied, 77 N.Y.2d 908, 572 N.E.2d 623, 569 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1991); People v.
McCaskill, 144 A.D.2d 496, 533 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (2d Dep't 1988); People v. Roides,
124 A.D.2d 967, 508 N.Y.S.2d 826 (4th Dep't 1986), appeal denied, 69 N.Y.2d 886,
19951
7
PACE LAW REVIEW
such evidence has been admitted to establish elements of the
crimes and related issues.
B. Intent and Absence of Mistake or Accident
Prior bad act evidence is especially probative and material
in establishing the mens rea of intent,36 especially where a de-
fendant's intent is not easily inferred from the commission of
the crimes themselves without reference to his prior conduct. 37
When a defendant is charged with domestic violence crimes in-
volving burglary, assault, attempted murder, or murder, he
may try to discredit the prosecution's proof on the issue of his
intent at the time of the crime. The defendant may, in a bur-
glary case, for example, claim that his intent was not to commit
a crime against his spouse or intimate partner once inside her
home, but merely to "talk" with the victim, thus asserting an
innocent explanation for the otherwise unlawful entry.
Likewise, in a case involving an intentional assault, at-
tempted murder or intentional murder, the defendant may
claim that the victim's injuries were caused by accident or mis-
take, and that they were not the result of his intentional con-
duct. The element of intent must be established beyond a
reasonable doubt on the prosecution's case-in-chief. Accord-
ingly, admission of proof of prior abusive conduct and threats
toward the victim becomes especially critical in order for the
trier of fact to understand that the defendant's conduct was not
accidental in nature.3 8 Indeed, in cases where a defendant
claims that the victim herself was somehow responsible for her
507 N.E.2d 1104, 515 N.Y.S.2d 1034 (1987); People v. Harris, 122 A.D.2d 493, 505
N.Y.S.2d 254 (3d Dep't 1986).
34. People v. Castrechino, 134 A.D.2d 877, 521 N.Y.S.2d 960 (4th Dep't 1987).
35. People v. Hernandez, 139 A.D.2d 477, 527 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1st Dep't 1988).
36. "Intent" is defined as "[acting] intentionally with respect to a result or to
conduct described by a statute defining an offense when [the perpetrator's] con-
scious objective is to cause such result or to engage in such conduct." N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 15.05 (1) (McKinney 1992).
37. People v. McDonald, 150 A.D.2d 805, 806, 542 N.Y.S.2d 42, 43 (2d Dep't
1989); People v. Roides, 124 A.D.2d 967, 508 N.Y.S.2d 826 (4th Dep't 1986), appeal
denied, 69 N.Y.2d 886, 507 N.E.2d 1104, 515 N.Y.S.2d 1034 (1987).
38. People v. Henson, 33 N.Y.2d 63, 304 N.E.2d 358, 349 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1973);
People v. Simpson, 132 A.D.2d 894, 518 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1987), appeal denied, 70
N.Y.2d 937; People v. Band, 125 A.D.2d 683, 509 N.Y.S.2d 570 (2d Dep't 1986);
People v. Sims, 110 A.D.2d 214, 494 N.Y.S.2d 114 (2d Dep't 1985).
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own injuries or that her injuries were otherwise caused by the
defendant's unintentional conduct, the domestic violence his-
tory evidence is necessary to discredit such claims. 39 The likeli-
hood of accidental or mistaken occurrences diminishes as the
number of previous episodes of domestic violence increases. 40
Domestic violence history evidence assumes significant rel-
evance when the accused plans to present a defense which, if
accepted by the trier of fact, could negate the element of intent.
Such defenses include, intoxication, 41 or the psychiatric de-
fenses of extreme emotional disturbance42 or not responsible by
reason of mental disease or defect.43
C. Necessary Background and Narrative
The typical juror hearing the domestic violence case is
likely to bring with him or her many misconceptions regarding
intrafamilial violence. Despite the fact that issues such as child
rearing and ordinary family life may be within the ken of the
average juror, "the dynamics of sexually and physically abusive
relationships within a family are not as familiar."44 As such, an
abuser's past history of bad acts and threats toward his spouse
or intimate partner is relevant and material to the understand-
ing of the relationship between the parties by the trier of fact.
Thus, domestic violence history evidence is admissible as neces-
sary background material to assist the trier of fact in under-
39. See People v. Sims, 110 A.D.2d 214, 494 N.Y.S.2d 114 (2d Dep't 1985).
40. Id. at 494 N.Y.S.2d at 121; see also People v. Basir, 179 A.D.2d 662, 578
N.Y.S.2d 603 (2d Dep't 1992).
41. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 15.25 (McKinney 1992).
42. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a) (McKinney 1992). This section states:
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death
of such person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution under
this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that:
(a) the defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional dis-
turbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the
reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the
defendant believed them to be.
Id.
43. Id. at § 40.15.
44. People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 288, 552 N.E.2d 131, 135, 552 N.Y.S.2d
883, 887 (1990).
1995]
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standing the nature of the crime, or to explain or to establish a
material fact.45
It is often necessary to inform the trier of fact of the se-
quence of events leading up to the crime in order to complete
the narrative of the events. Prior bad act evidence is admissible
pursuant to this theory, particularly in domestic violence cases
where the admission of such evidence will facilitate the jury's
comprehension of the dynamics of the relationship so as to en-
hance their understanding of the crime itself.46 The thrust of
the argument favoring the admission of domestic violence his-
tory evidence is that such evidence is inextricably interwoven
with otherwise admissible evidence and is thus necessary for a
full comprehension of directly related evidence. 47 Specifically,
evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts and threats toward the
victim is essential to aid the trier of fact in understanding com-
mon issues such as a victim's delaying the disclosure of the
crimes, recanting of allegations, or the victim's staying with an
abusive partner.4 These issues can be particularly troublesome
to a jury, especially if the jury is comprised of individuals with
no personal experience with domestic violence. Admission of
domestic violence history evidence ensures that there will not
be undue speculation on these issues.49
In connection with the theory that prior domestic violence
history evidence should be admitted at trial as it is essential to
necessary background and interwoven with other evidence in
45. People v. Shorey, 172 A.D.2d 634, 635, 568 N.Y.2d 436, 437 (2d Dep't
1991), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 974, 580 N.E.2d 426, 574 N.Y.S.2d 954 (1991);
People v. LeGrand, 76 A.D.2d 706, 431 N.Y.S.2d 850 (2d Dep't 1980).
46. People v. Singh, 186 A.D.2d 285, 588 N.Y.S.2d 573 (2d Dep't 1992) (Miller,
J. dissenting).
47. People v. Ely, 68 N.Y.2d 520, 510 N.Y.S.2d 532, 503 N.E.2d 88 (1986);
People v. Pitts, 202 A.D.2d 368, 612 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1st Dep't 1994); People v. Lin-
ton, 166 A.D.2d 670, 561 N.Y.S.2d 922, 571 N.E.2d 92 (1991); People v.
Cheeseboro, 162 A.D.2d 286, 556 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1st Dep't 1990); People v. Powell,
157 A.D.2d 524, 549 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1st Dep't 1990); People v. Tabora, 139 A.D.2d
540, 527 N.Y.S.2d 36 (2d Dep't 1988), appeal denied, 72 N.Y.2d 925, 529 N.E.2d
189, 532 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1988).
48. See People v. Singh, 186 A.D.2d 285, 588 N.Y.S.2d 573 (2d Dep't 1992);
People v. Ranum, 122 A.D.2d 959, 506 N.Y.S.2d 105 (2d Dep't 1986); People v.
Gomez, 112 A.D.2d 445, 492 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2d Dep't 1985); People v. Mattison, 97
A.D.2d 621; PRINCE, supra note 9, § 292, at 263.
49. See generally People v. Millington, 134 A.D.2d 645, 521 N.Y.S.2d 167 (3d
Dep't 1987).
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the case, the prosecution frequently calls expert witnesses in
domestic violence cases. These expert witnesses provide juries
with relevant information regarding a victim's state of mind at
the time of the crime, and provide them with a framework
within which they, as the triers of fact, can make an informed
assessment of the victim's credibility, which is the essence of
the case. Expert witnesses in domestic violence cases have been
permitted to testify about the dynamics of abusive relation-
ships, common patterns of behavior, and characteristics of wo-
men who are involved in these relationships.50
In order for the expert witness to adequately address the
specific issues in a particular domestic violence case, the expert
must be permitted to comment on the prior history of violence
between the defendant and the victim, as it relates to such is-
sues as why the battered woman did not leave the relationship
after a single episode of abuse, and the nature of the continuous
threat under which the battered woman lived. The presence of
a continuous threat of abuse bears significantly on such issues
as: (1) delayed disclosure to law enforcement officials; (2) re-
canted allegations; and (3) continued contact between a victim
and her abuser subsequent to his arrest. Additionally, expert
testimony can explain why a victim may refuse to cooperate
with the prosecution, or why, perhaps, she is called to testify on
behalf of her abuser. The psychological and societal aspects of a
relationship involving domestic violence are not within the un-
derstanding of the average juror; as such, expert testimony is
often needed to clarify and to explain this area of human rela-
tions which is otherwise viewed inaccurately and skeptically.
Thus, evidence of a defendant's prior domestic violence against
his victim is inextricably interwoven with the admissible testi-
mony by an expert witness in these cases.
50. See People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 552 N.E.2d 131, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883
(1990); People v. Keindl, 117 A.D.2d 679, 68 N.Y.2d 410 (2d Dep't 1986); People v.
Emick, 103 A.D.2d 643, 481 N.Y.S.2d 552 (4th Dep't 1984); People v. Fisher, 73
A.D.2d 886, 424 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1st Dep't 1980), aff'd, 53 N.Y.2d 907,423 N.E.2d 53,
440 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1981); People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358
(N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Bronx County 1985).
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D. To Establish an Element of the Crime Charged
Where a victim's state of mind is in issue, such as in con-
nection with the element of forcible compulsion in a domestic
sexual offense case, the prosecution must establish this mate-
rial element of force beyond a reasonable doubt on its case-in-
chief. Accordingly, the way the victim perceived her abuser's
force is critical to the jury's assessment of whether or not the
defendant committed the crimes of rape in the first degree, 51
sodomy in the first degree, 52 sexual abuse in the first degree, 53
and aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree54 or second
degree. 55
In connection with a forcible sexual offense, the prosecution
must prove that the defendant compelled the victim to act by
forcible compulsion. Forcible compulsion is "the use of physical
force, or a threat, express or implied, which places a person in
fear of immediate death or physical injury to himself, herself or
another person, or in fear that he, she or another person will
immediately be kidnapped."56 All too often in domestic violence
cases involving sexual crimes, the defendant does not actually
strike the victim or use a weapon to ensure her compliance with
his sexual demands. The victim generally testifies that she
"submitted" to the sexual acts because of the defendant's prior
abuse toward her, and because she believed that if she did not
comply, he would cause her, or perhaps her children, physical
injury or death. It is because of the prior abusive conduct that
the victim believes that an implied threat toward her, or some-
one close to her, exists. It is thus imperative that prosecutors
be allowed to introduce the prior charged and uncharged
crimes, bad acts, threats, and statements of the defendant,
which contributed to the victim's state of mind at the time of the
sexual offense.57
51. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.35 (1) (McKinney 1992).
52. Id. at § 130.50 (1).
53. Id. at § 130.65 (1).
54. Id. at § 130.70 (1)(a).
55. Id. at § 130.67 (1)(a).
56. Id. at § 130.00 (8)(a)(b).
57. People v. Thompson, 72 N.Y.2d 410, 530 N.E.2d 839, 534 N.Y.S.2d 132
(1988)(the evidence provided a sufficient basis for the conclusion that defendant's
threats caused the victim to fear death or serious injury); People v. Thompson, 158
A.D.2d 563, 551 N.Y.S.2d 332 (2d Dep't 1990)(evidence of sexual molestation was
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Likewise, when a defendant is charged with the crime of
unlawful imprisonment in the first or second degrees,58 the
prosecution must prove the material element of restraint; spe-
cifically that the defendant unlawfully restrained the victim
without her consent. In order to show that the defendant re-
strained the victim without her consent, the prosecution must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was moved or
confined by physical force, intimidation, or deception.5 9 Prior
bad acts and threats by the defendant toward the victim are
therefore relevant and probative in establishing this material
element in connection with the charge of unlawful
imprisonment.
In a domestic homicide case where the defendant is charged
with depraved indifference murder by causing the death of his
spouse or intimate partner "under circumstances evincing a de-
praved indifference to human life,"60 the prosecution must show
on its direct case the factual setting in which the defendant's
conduct occurred. It is this factual setting that elevates the
homicide to murder, despite the fact that the mens rea of this
crime is one of recklessness, and differentiates it from the lesser
crime of reckless manslaughter. A history of prior domestic vio-
lence by the defendant toward the victim, particularly when in
close proximity to the death, may assist the trier of fact in as-
sessing the degree of risk presented by the defendant, and in
determining whether or not the defendant's conduct was "so
wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so devoid of
regard of the life or lives of others, and so blameworthy as to
warrant the same criminal liability as that which the law im-
offered to show the victim's continuing fear of the defendant); People v. Bermudez,
109 A.D.2d 674, 487 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1988) (evidence that defendant grabbed the victim
constituted a threat, which placed the victim in fear of death or personal injury);
People v. Grant, 104 A.D.2d 674, 479 N.Y.S.2d 914 (3d Dep't 1984)(prior and sub-
sequent uncharged crimes were admissible to show the defendant's intent, motive,
and plan to promote prostitution and coercion); People v. Benjamin R., 103 A.D.2d
663, 481 N.Y.S.2d 827 (4th Dep't 1984)(the victim's testimony of prior abuse by the
defendant was sufficient to support an inference of a continuous threat of injury, if
the victim did not submit to sexual acts); People v. Barlow, 88 A.D.2d 668, 451
N.Y.S.2d 254 (3d Dep't 1982)(the defendant's violent treatment of his wife and
children was admissible as relevant to prove the victim's state of mind, and to
prove the element of forcible compulsion).
58. N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 135.05, 135.10 (McKinney 1992).
59. Id. at § 135.00 (1)(a).
60. Id. at § 125.25 (2).
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poses upon a person who intentionally causes the death of
another."61
E. To Counter Defenses and Other Claims by the Defendant
Domestic violence history evidence is particularly effective
in refuting the defense of justification,62 and psychiatric de-
fenses, such as extreme emotional disturbance 3 and not re-
sponsible by reason of mental disease or defect.64 Evidence of
prior domestic violence may also be utilized to counter defense
claims in the criminal trial that the defendant was intoxicated
at the time of the incident, and that such intoxication negated
an element of the crime charged.65 Additionally, such evidence
may be used to rebut impeachment of the domestic violence vic-
tim's credibility by claiming that the witness has a motive to
fabricate the charges or that some of her allegations are the re-
sult of a recent fabrication.
Other charged and uncharged crimes and bad acts of the
defendant assume particular significance when the defendant
puts his mental state into issue at a criminal trial by setting
forth a so-called insanity defense. In People v. Santarelli,6 the
Court of Appeals noted that:
[E]vidence of uncharged criminal or immoral conduct may be ad-
mitted as part of the People's case on rebuttal if it has a tendency
to disprove the defendant's claim that he was legally insane at the
time of the crime .... Having placed his mental state before the
trier of fact, the defendant cannot complain when the People seek
to bring forth additional evidence bearing upon that issue.67
Thus, the defendant cannot have it both ways; if he puts his
mental state at the time of the crime before the trier of fact, he
cannot then try to preclude the prosecution from introducing
61. People v. Fenner, 61 N.Y.2d 971, 972, 463 N.E.2d 617, 618, 475 N.Y.S.2d
276, 277 (1984); People v. Register, 60 N.Y.2d 270, 457 N.E.2d 704, 469 N.Y.S.2d
599 (1983); People v. Moquin, 142 A.D.2d 347, 536 N.Y.S.2d 561 (3d Dep't 1988);
People v. Sika, 138 A.D.2d 935, 526 N.Y.S.2d 683 (4th Dep't 1988).
62. N.Y. PENAL LAw art. 35 (McKinney 1992).
63. Id. at § 125.25 (1)(a).
64. Id. at § 40.15.
65. Id. at § 15.25.
66. 49 N.Y.2d 241, 401 N.E.2d 199, 425 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1980).
67. Id. at 248-49, 401 N.E.2d at 204, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 82; see also People v.
Ryklin, 150 A.D.2d 509, 541 N.Y.S.2d 103 (2d Dep't 1989).
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relevant and material evidence of his prior conduct that may be
dispositive of that issue.68 When the defendant "opens the door"
to his prior mental history such as by presenting expert testi-
mony in connection with a psychiatric defense, the prosecution
must be allowed to cross-examine the defendant's psychiatric
expert as to the expert's awareness of the defendant's prior bad
acts, as they are relevant to the issue of the expert's credibility,
as well as the merits of the psychiatric defense itself.69
Other instances when the defendant "opens the door" to the
admission of prior bad act evidence include situations when the
defendant relies upon a justification defense to explain his use
of physical or deadly physical force against his spouse or inti-
mate partner,70 or when the defendant asserts a claim of dimin-
ished capacity at the time of the crime as the result of
intoxication. One such example is People v. Hawker.71 In
Hawker, the Second Department affirmed the defendant's con-
viction for murder in the second degree in connection with the
stabbing death of the defendant's wife in the presence of their
three children. 72 The defendant claimed at trial that he was in-
toxicated at the time of the stabbing, and thus, did not have the
requisite intent to commit the crime of murder.73 The defend-
ant interposed a justification defense as well. The trial court
admitted the children's testimony regarding the defendant's
prior assaults upon their mother as probative not only on the
issues of the defendant's motive and intent, but also because
such domestic violence history evidence "reflected a pattern of
similar acts inspired by the same underlying motive, and
tended to show that the fatal stabbing was a continuation of
that pattern of violence, and was likewise intentional rather
than merely the product of intoxication or an act of self-
defense."74
68. Ryklin, 150 A.D.2d at 511, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 105; see also People v. Foster,
159 A.D.2d 801, 553 N.Y.S.2d 489 (3d Dep't 1990).
69. People v. Gantz, 104 A.D.2d 692, 480 N.Y.S.2d 583 (3d Dep't 1984).
70. People v. Montana, 192 A.D.2d 623, 596 N.Y.S.2d 154 (2d Dep't 1993);
People v. Barnes, 176 A.D.2d 337, 574 N.Y.S.2d 522 (2d Dep't 1991).
71. 626 N.Y.S.2d 524 (2d Dep't 1995).
72. Id. at 524.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 525.
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In domestic violence cases where the defense attempts to
impeach the victim's credibility by demonstrating that she has
a motive to fabricate the allegations against the defendant, par-
ticularly where there has been a delayed disclosure of the crime,
the victim may be permitted to testify about prior episodes of
violence committed by the defendant. In order to impeach the
victim, the defendant will typically try to attribute motives such
as jealousy or financial interest to the victim as a basis for her
fabrication. By putting these issues before the jury, the defense
"opens the door" to the admission of prior domestic violence his-
tory evidence. 75 Furthermore, if the defense claims that a vic-
tim fabricated some or all of the allegations at or around the
time of the trial, the prosecution should be permitted to intro-
duce prior consistent statements of the victim made at a time
when she had no motive to fabricate in order to repel that impu-
tation. This evidence would not improperly bolster the victim's
credibility.76
F. The Application and Cautionary Instruction
An application must be made to the trial judge, and a pre-
trial ruling rendered, before the prosecution may properly intro-
duce domestic violence history evidence. The prosecution's ap-
plication should be made as early as possible to give sufficient
notice and to obtain a ruling. This allows the prosecutor to ad-
dress this evidence in his or her jury voir dire and opening
statement. 77
The motion in limine, commonly referred to as the "Ven-
timiglia Application,"78 should be made by way of a full offer of
proof by the prosecutor. Although a hearing is not always re-
75. People v. Melendez, 55 N.Y.2d 445, 451-52, 434 N.E.2d 1324, 1327, 449
N.Y.S.2d 946, 949-50 (1982); People v. Wilens, 198 A.D.2d 463, 603 N.Y.S.2d 585
(2d Dep't 1993), appeal denied, 83 N.Y.2d 812, 633 N.E.2d 503, 611 N.Y.S.2d 148
(1994); People v. Jones, 173 A.D.2d 331, 575 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1st Dep't 1991), appeal
denied, 78 N.Y.2d 1012, 581 N.E.2d 1066, 575 N.Y.S.2d 820 (1991); People v. Stan-
ley, 135 A.D.2d 910, 522 N.Y.S.2d 309 (3d Dep't 1987); People v. Respass, 623
N.Y.S.2d 337, (2d Dep't 1995), appeal denied, 85 N.Y.2d 979, 653 N.E.2d 635, 629
N.Y.S.2d 739 (1995).
76. People v. Sease-Bey, 111 A.D.2d 195, 488 N.Y.S.2d 822 (2d Dep't 1985),
appeal denied, 66 N.Y.2d 618, 485 N.E.2d 245, 494 N.Y.S.2d 1041 (1985).
77. People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350, 420 N.E.2d 59, 438 N.Y.S.2d 261
(1981).
78. Id.
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quired, the trial judge may order a hearing, at which time the
prosecutor must produce witnesses to detail the proffered evi-
dence.79 At the hearing, the prosecutor must establish the pur-
pose for which the evidence is being offered, and as a threshold
matter, must identify a purpose other than mere criminal pro-
pensity. Thereafter, the prosecutor must demonstrate how the
probative value of the proffered evidence outweighs its prejudi-
cial effect. The prosecutor must establish the defendant's in-
volvement in the prior incidents by clear and convincing
evidence.80
A pre-trial memorandum of law should be prepared when a
favorable Ventimiglia ruling is critical to the prosecution's case.
The memorandum should contain the facts of the case, the prof-
fered evidence, and supporting case law, because the ultimate
decision on admissibility rests entirely within the trial judge's
discretion. Despite a plethora of cases which supports the ad-
missibility of prior bad act evidence in domestic violence prose-
cutions, the application may fall on deaf ears if the trial judge is
not educated as to the applicable decisional law.
If the prosecutor is permitted to introduce domestic vio-
lence history evidence on the direct case, the trial judge must
instruct the jury as to the limited purposes for which the jury
must consider this evidence. The judge must also advise the
jury that they must not consider such evidence as probative of a
criminal propensity or general bad character of the defendant.
The cautionary instruction should be given both at the time of
the admission of the evidence, and as part of the general charge
to the jury at the conclusion of the case, before commencement
of deliberations.8 1
79. People v. Battes, 190 A.D.2d 625, 594 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1st Dep't 1993), ap-
peal denied, 81 N.Y.2d 1011, 616 N.E.2d 855, 600 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1993); People v.
Charleston, 175 A.D.2d 602, 572 N.Y.S.2d 260 (4th Dep't 1991), appeal denied, 78
N.Y.2d 1126, 586 N.E.2d 67, 578 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1991).
80. See People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40, 535 N.E.2d 250, 538 N.Y.S.2d 197
(1988); People v. Robinson, 68 N.Y.2d 541, 503 N.E.2d 485, 510 N.Y.S.2d 837
(1986); People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350, 420 N.E.2d 59, 438 N.Y.S.2d 261
(1981).
81. See People v. Robinson, 68 N.Y.2d 541, 503 N.E.2d 485, 510 N.Y.S.2d 837
(1986); People v. Ingram, 67 N.Y.2d 897, 492 N.E.2d 1220, 501 N.Y.S.2d 804
(1986); People v. Williams, 50 N.Y.2d 996, 409 N.E.2d 949, 431 N.Y.S.2d 477
(1980); People v. Mees, 47 N.Y.2d 997, 394 N.E.2d 283, 420 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1979);
People v. Maggio, 137 A.D.2d 623, 524 N.Y.S.2d 511 (2d Dep't 1988).
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III. The Legislative Response to Family Violence
In 1994, the New York State Legislature passed a compre-
hensive law known as "The Family Protection and Domestic Vi-
olence Intervention Act of 1994" (hereinafter the Act).8 2 The
Legislature acknowledged in the preamble to the Act that in
New York, domestic violence is a prevalent and serious problem
with detrimental consequences to our families, as well as to our
"social services, legal, medical and criminal justice systems."8 3
The Legislature also recognized the need to enhance the
laws in New York that address issues of domestic violence, in-
cluding increasing penalties for certain crimes,84 and holding
law enforcement and the judiciary more accountable to the vic-
tims of family violence by requiring training,8 5 maintaining
records,8 6 and mandating arrests in certain types of cases.8 7
As a result of the Act, the Criminal Procedure Law now
mandates that police prepare written reports which document
domestic violence incidents.88 Police officers must file their re-
ports along with witness statements. This creates a "paper
trail" of domestic violence episodes, which can be crucial in the
successful prosecution of future crimes. Such documentation
may serve to circumstantially identify the killer in a homicide
case where the victim is unable to do so, or may corroborate a
victim's account of a history of violence, if such evidence is ad-
missible at trial pursuant to any of the theories previously dis-
cussed. The preparation and maintenance of domestic violence
incident reports is required by law whether or not an arrest is
made, and the responding law enforcement agency must keep
the report on file for at least four years.8 9
82. Ch. 222, [1994] N.Y. Laws 786 (McKinney)(revised at ch. 224, § 1 [1994]
N.Y. Laws 808).
83. Id.
84. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 170.55 (McKinney 1992)(Adjournment in Contempla-
tion of Dismissal); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 120.14(3)(McKinney 1992)(Menacing in the
Second Degree); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.51 (b)(c) and (d)(McKinney 1992)(Criminal
Contempt in the First Degree).
85. Ch. 222, § 48 [1994] N.Y. Laws 800 (McKinney).
86. N.Y. CRIM. Paoc. LAw § 140.10(5)(McKinney 1995).
87. N.Y. CRam. PROC. LAW § 140.10 (4)(McKinney 1995)(amended by ch. 224,
§ 5-a [1994] N.Y. Laws 810 (McKinney)).
88. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 140.10 (5) (McKinney 1995).
89. N.Y. CPiM. PRoc. LAw § 140.10 (5)(McKinney 1995)(amended by ch. 224,
§ 5 [1994] N.Y. Laws 811 (McKinney 1995).
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Victims of family violence must be encouraged to come for-
ward and to report the crimes perpetrated upon them when it is
safe for them to do so. In the past, police officers frequently did
not effectively respond to calls for help in domestic violence situ-
ations. In the event that an abuser was not arrested, police of-
ficers rarely prepared a report of the incident. Without
documentary evidence, such as incident reports and deposi-
tions, as well as such evidence as "911" tapes and photographs
of injured victims, a witness who testifies in a domestic violence
prosecution regarding prior bad acts by the defendant is left to
carry the entire burden of convincing the trier of fact that there
actually was a history of violence; in essence, the strength of the
domestic violence case rests solely on the victim's credibility. In
an age where jurors' expectations from law enforcement agen-
cies are greater than ever before, the testimony of the victim
alone is often viewed as insufficient to warrant a guilty verdict,
despite its legal sufficiency. The documentation of this type of
evidence by law enforcement officials and the admission of the
evidence by the judge on the prosecution's case at trial, will
strengthen the case, and thus, give victims more incentive to
proceed. The criminal justice system will be perceived as work-
ing to protect the victim, while also preserving the accused's
constitutional rights to a fair trial.
While the Act creates a mandate for the creation of a paper
trail in all domestic violence cases, and even sets forth an evi-
dentiary rule permitting a written or oral admission or testi-
mony from the Family Court to be received into evidence in a
criminal proceeding for impeachment purposes,90 the law is si-
lent on the use of prior domestic violence history evidence in a
criminal case. The Legislature has left the determination of
this weighty evidentiary matter to the sole discretion of the ju-
diciary. The problem, however, is that if a trial judge is not re-
ceptive to this type of evidence, legal arguments will not be
persuasive; thus, the prosecution may be severely impaired.
Previously, the New York State Legislature had taken a
strong position to encourage the protection of crime victims by
passing laws that made the prosecution of sexual offenses less
embarrassing and more encouraging to the victim. For exam-
90. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 60.46 (McKinney 1995).
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pie, in 1975, the "Rape Shield Law"91 went into effect setting
forth the general evidentiary rule that a victim's prior sexual
history is inadmissible in a sexual offense prosecution, unless it
comes within one of the specifically designated statutory excep-
tions.92 With the passage of this law, the Legislature made it
clear that harassment of victims of sexual crimes would not be
tolerated in New York, nor would confusion of issues that have
no bearing on the defendant's guilt or innocence be allowed by
way of cross-examination into the victim's past sexual con-
duct.93 This law "serves an important public interest by remov-
ing one of the impediments that caused many victims of sex
offenses not to report them."94 Judicial discretion is not entirely
eliminated and is actually incorporated into the Rape Shield
Law. The thrust of the legislative provision, however, reflects
public policy by prohibiting the introduction of evidence of the
victim's sexual history.
Similarly, in 1990, the Legislature expanded the Rape
Shield Law to include victims of non-sexual offenses in Criminal
Procedure Law section 60.43.95 As in New York Criminal Proce-
dure Law section 60.42, the issue of a victim's sexual history is
presumed to be irrelevant in a non-sexual offense case. Unlike
Criminal Procedure Law Section 60.42, however, section 60.43
does not set forth legislative exceptions for admissibility.
Before the trial judge receives evidence of a victim's sexual his-
tory in the interests of justice, the proponent of such evidence
must make a threshold showing of relevance. The judge must
set forth his or her reasons for admission of the evidence to pre-
vent the exercise of arbitrary discretion. According to McKin-
ney's Practice Commentary, "[Section 60.43] reflects a
legislative judgment that the frequency of unjustified use of the
victim's prior sexual conduct to cloud the relevant issues in
criminal trials justifies the establishment of a presumption of
irrelevance of such evidence." 96
91. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 60.42 (McKinney 1992).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAw § 60.43 (McKinney 1995)
96. N.Y. CPiM. PRoc. LAw § 60.43 commentary at 15 (McKinney 1992).
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In 1994, New York Criminal Procedure Law Section 60.48,
prohibiting evidence of a victim's manner of dress at the time of
the commission of a sexual crime, became effective.9 7 As noted
in the Practice Commentary to this law:
Absent this legislation, an attempt to introduce such evidence, if
met with an objection, would be subject to a ruling as to relevance
governed by judicial discretion. While there is no reason to be-
lieve that judges in this state would admit such evidence on the
ground that the manner of the victim's dress somehow indicated
consent, the legislative sponsors believed that a special safeguard
would be appropriate, citing a newspaper report quoting the re-
mark of a juror after acquittal of a Florida rape defendant subse-
quently convicted of rape in Georgia, to wit: 'the way she was
dressed, she was asking for it.'9 8
This provision does not completely eliminate judicial discre-
tion but does put the burden of proof on the proponent of this
type of evidence (who would no doubt be the defense and not the
prosecution). The trial judge is held to a standard of accounta-
bility should he or she rule that this evidence is admissible. 99
The judge must make findings that the victim's manner of dress
is relevant and admissible in the interests of justice, and must
further set forth on the record, his or her findings that support
this decision. 100
These laws were enacted to ease the way for crime victims
who testify in criminal cases that are replete with sensitive, if
not difficult, issues. They reflect public policy and eliminate
prejudicial and irrelevant information from being placed before
the trier of fact; information that may, and often does, cloud the
real issues and evidence surrounding the defendant's guilt or
innocence.
With the enactment of the Family Protection and Domestic
Violence Intervention Act of 1994, New York State lawmakers
have taken a stand and publicly announced that acts of domes-
tic violence are criminal and threaten the very fabric of our
communities. The time has come for the legislature to go even
97. N.Y. Cium. PRoc. LAW § 60.48 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
98. Id.
99. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 60.48 commentary at 83-84 (McKinney Supp.
1995).
100. N.Y. CmIM. PRoc. LAw § 60.48 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
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further by creating laws that establish a presumption of rele-
vance and admissibility of domestic violence history evidence in
the criminal case. Many judges throughout the State still hesi-
tate to grant a victim of a family offense an order of protection,
even when the abuser has been arrested and there is evidence
of injury. Judges are often reluctant to send a convicted abuser
to jail, even when there has been a violation of an order of pro-
tection. Jail sentences are often reserved for only the most
egregious of cases which, by law, require the imposition of a
mandatory state prison sentence.
If, as the preamble to the Act suggests, our lawmakers have
declared war on domestic violence, they now have a concomitant
responsibility to provide prosecutors with the legal weapons
with which to fight the battle. Other states have gone further
than New York and have enacted creative laws that permit the
use of prior bad act evidence in a criminal case.101 While it is
commendable that the New York Legislature wants to take a
strong position against domestic violence crimes, all of the
heightened awareness will be for naught if these cases are not
successfully prosecuted in our courts of law. Perhaps the only
way to change judicial attitudes about domestic violence is to
legislatively mandate rules of evidence as to ensure that both
parties, the defendant and the victim, will receive a fair trial.
Prosecutors have but one opportunity to convict an abuser. An
acquittal may ultimately result in the victim becoming yet an-
other statistic, and an example of how the system failed.
The time has come for our legislators to once again take a
position in safeguarding the rights of domestic violence victims.
As Ann Jones repeatedly states in her book, Next Time She'll Be
Dead, "women and children have an absolute right to live free
101. See CAL. Evm. CODE § 1101(b) (West 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 90.404(2)(a) (West 1979); IDAHO CODE § 404(3)(b) (1995); IND. CODE § 404(b)
(1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-455 (1994); MICH. COMP. LAwS ANN. § 768.27 (West
1982); MiNN. STAT. §§ 634.20, 609.185, 609.185(5) (Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 404(3)(b) (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-404(2) (1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-
404(B) (Michie 1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 404(B) (Anderson 1995); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-202(a)(4) (Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 404(b) (1995); VT. STAT.
ANN. § 404(b) (1994); WASH. REv. CODE § 9A-32.005; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 904.04(2)
(West 1993); see Margaret C. Hobday, A Constitutional Response to the Realities of
Intimate Violence: Minnesota's Domestic Homicide Statute, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 1285
(1994).
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from bodily harm."10 2 Jurors must hear about the history of do-
mestic violence when determining the guilt or innocence of an
abuser so that a miscarriage of justice does not occur. The rele-
vance and materiality of this type of evidence cannot be overem-
phasized; its admission in, or preclusion from, the criminal case
may ultimately make the difference between life and death.
102. ANN JONES, NXr TIME SHE'LL BE DEAD: BArTERING AND HOW TO STOP
IT, 4 (1994).
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